Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute
 Research Paper: Environmental Mediation











 

 

Environmental Mediation and Public Managers:
What Do We Know and How Do We Know It?
by Dr. Rosemary O'Leary

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to assess the major themes in the literature concerning environmental mediation, with the express purpose of examining the strength of the evidence that might support, or not support, the use of environmental mediation techniques by public managers. Two questions are raised concerning the environmental mediation literature. First, what do we think we know about environmental mediation? Second, how do we know what we know? That is, are there any empirical foundations to what we know? The primary concern is whether there is evidence-based research to support the claims for environmental mediation in the literature surveyed.

This paper concludes that, despite the plethora of literature touting the advantages of environmental mediation (and, at times, the disadvantages), the empirical foundations for most of the conclusions are quite weak. While there are some strong conceptual works, few scholars have studied environmental mediation through one or more of the standard empirical methods: theoretically informed case studies, comparative case analyses, surveys, interviews, and statistical analyses of quantitative data. Given the paucity of empirically based research, it must be concluded that much of our "knowledge" concerning environmental mediation is based primarily on thoughtful speculation or wisdom, with few data (broadly defined) to support it.
   

Contents

Introduction

Consider the following environmental challenges that have confronted public managers. A community wants to build a new elementary school building and discovers that the land designated for the new school is contaminated with oil. A zoning board denies the application of a hardware store to expand, based on a fear that increased traffic will result in violations of the Clean Air Act; the zoning board is promptly sued. A regional hospital is no longer allowed to dispose of medical waste in a county incinerator. A leaking county landfill becomes the state's worst Superfund site. What do these examples - only a few of the hundreds of environmental challenges facing local, state, and federal governments today - have in common? In each case environmental mediation was utilized to resolve the ensuing public management dispute.

The literature is ripe with normative pleas to increase the role of the lay public and interested stakeholders in environmental disputes given the perception that "environmental conflict appears to be increasing exponentially" (Lach, 1996: 211). One author, for example, argues that such participation in the resolution of water conflicts in the western United States is a fundamental tenet of our democratic government (Waller, 1995). Another argues that the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques could greatly improve the management of Superfund cleanups (Whitman, 1993). The United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Office of Site Remediation claims in one of its publications that the benefits of ADR in its environmental enforcement actions include lower transaction costs, a focus on problem solving (as opposed to posturing), the generation of settlement options that are more likely to be tailored to stakeholders' needs, and the saving of time (EPA, 1995). This echoes Folberg and Taylor (1984: 220) who wrote:

Mediation can provide conflict resolution for environmental disputes far less expensively, in terms of time and money, than can litigation. Moreover, it can provide all participants a greater sense of satisfaction because of their active role. It allows the participants to maintain a degree of control. It allows the consideration of more creative environmental options than does litigation. Most important, mediation promotes cooperation.

Finally, a study of a solid waste management conflict in North Carolina concludes that state and local governments may be able to positively resolve such disputes by taking on a mediation-like problem-solving attitude, searching for win-win results (Jenks, 1994).

Yet, despite these claims and pleas, there is very little analysis of environmental mediation efforts in the public management literature. Exceptions include deHaven-Smith and Wodraska (1996) who examined consensus-building in integrated resources planning, Fiorino (1988) who looked at regulatory negotiation as a policy process at the EPA, Blackburn (1988) who examined environmental mediation as an alternative to litigation, and Perritt (1986) who analyzed the use of ADR techniques in negotiated rulemaking. There also are a few authors who have examined generic conflict resolution techniques and their applicability to public management. (See e.g., Zhiyong, 1997.) The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to assess the major themes in the literature concerning environmental mediation, with the express purpose of examining the strength of the evidence that might support, or not support, the use of environmental mediation techniques by public managers.

The term environmental mediation, as used in this paper, is defined quite broadly to incorporate environmental dispute resolution generally. Environmental dispute resolution means the variety of approaches that allow parties to meet face to face to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues in a dispute or potentially controversial situation (Bingham, 1986). It is often viewed as intervention between conflicting parties or viewpoints to promote reconciliation, settlement, compromise or understanding in the environmental arena (McCrory, 1981). This includes mere assistance from a neutral third party to the negotiation process (Bingham et al 1987). Such assistance can be directed toward settling disputes arising out of past events, or can be directed toward establishing rules to govern future conduct, such as in the case of regulatory-negotiation (Eisenberg, 1976).

Two questions are raised concerning the environmental mediation literature. First, what do we think we know about environmental mediation? Second, how do we know what we know? That is, are there any empirical foundations to what we know? Empirical is defined as follows: "It must rely on perceptions, experience, and observations. Perception is a fundamental tenet of the scientific approach, and it is achieved through our senses. . . . Knowledge is held to be a product of one's experiences, as facets of the physical, biological, and social world play upon the senses. . . . [It is based on the assumption that] pure reason alone is [in]sufficient to produce verifiable knowledge" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1987, pp. 9-10). Hence, the primary concern is whether there is evidence-based research to support the claims for environmental mediation in the literature surveyed here.

This paper concludes that, despite the plethora of literature touting the advantages of environmental mediation (and, at times, the disadvantages), the empirical foundations for most of the conclusions are quite weak. While there are some strong conceptual works, few scholars have studied environmental mediation through one or more of the standard empirical methods: theoretically informed case studies, comparative case analyses, surveys, interviews, and statistical analyses of quantitative data. Given the paucity of empirically based research, it must be concluded that much of our "knowledge" concerning environmental mediation is based primarily on thoughtful speculation or wisdom, with few data (broadly defined) to support it.

A few caveats are in order. First, the literature cited here is not the only scholarly discourse on the subject. I have selected what I consider to be only those works that address some of the most fundamental issues in environmental mediation today. These include the key elements of environmental disputes, the supposed success of environmental mediation, and factors that contribute to the success or failure of mediation efforts in the environmental arena.

Second, surveying methods of inquiry in the literature proved to be an immense challenge with imprecise results. In many cases, the authors did not articulate in their works what their methods of inquiry or sources of data were. In such instances, there was no choice but to infer methodology from the context of the work.

Third, not all findings presented here are created equal. They were taken directly from the literature, as presented by the authors. Some address very specific and narrowly defined areas of environmental mediation; others are broader in nature. Differences in wording and coverage of the findings reflect the different approaches to this type of research found in the literature.

Fourth, by assessing the empirical nature of the following works, it is not intended to imply that empiricism is "good" while other types of research are "bad." The intention is not to judge but rather to map the collective observations and claims of authors in the field. The hope is that, by assessing the evidence concerning environmental mediation, both gaps in the literature and future opportunities for research will become evident.

The following are the major findings in the literature concerning environmental mediation. They have been divided into several broad themes, including findings concerning the parties, motivation to negotiate, the role of government officials, goals, timing, the importance of issues, the role of morals and values, the role of mediators and facilitators, power, implementation, education, structure and process, and alternative approaches.

The Key Elements of Environmental Disputes

Most of the literature on environmental mediation maintains (without citing empirical evidence) that there are characteristics of environmental disputes that add to the complexity of environmental mediation. These characteristics include: multiple forums for decision making; inter-organizational, as opposed to interpersonal, conflicts; multiple parties; multiple issues; technical complexity and scientific uncertainty; unequal power and resources; and public/political arenas for problem solving. McCarthy and Shorett (1984), without citing much empirical evidence, but impliedly basing their conclusions on their experiences as mediators, point out that a crucial feature of environmental disputes is that they typically involve decisions concerning fundamental and irreversible alterations in the physical environment. Smith, in a work edited by Sandole and Sandole-Staroste (1987) makes similar statements without citing empirical evidence, but implying that the conclusions are based on the author's experience with U.S. Geological Survey. Environmental disputes also are often characterized by one side controlling the technical data, writes Riesel (1985), citing two cases studies.

Without citing any empirical evidence, Susskind (1978) makes five major claims concerning environmental disputes: First, in most environmental disputes, a few individuals or groups are in the position of paying a high cost so that others can win modest gains. Second, environmental disputes tend to pit those who stand to gain short-term economic advantages against others who fear long-term environmental losses. Third, in most environmental disputes, the supposed benefits are easier to describe than the alleged costs. Fourth, in most environmental disputes, it is difficult to let the individuals most affected by a decision have the greatest say because of expansive boundaries, externalities, or spillovers. Fifth, groups that stand to lose if an environmental project proceeds find it easier to organize than those that have something to gain (with the exception of generations yet unborn).

Also without citing any empirical evidence, but impliedly basing this conclusion on "wisdom" gleaned from experience with the U.S. Geological Survey, Smith (1987), in the work by Sandole and Sandole-Staroste, claims that mediation seems to be particularly relevant to the 60 to 70 percent of environmental cases that appear to be caused simply by misinformation. This statement is seemingly confirmed by Carpenter and Kennedy (1985) who maintain that lack of necessary information encourages conflict in the environmental arena. Carpenter and Kennedy's conclusion is based on their experiences as environmental mediators.

While not all the claims in the environmental mediation literature concerning the key elements of environmental disputes are presented without empirical evidence, when such evidence is presented, it is sketchy at best. For example, basing his findings on six case studies, Talbot (1983) concluded that an estimated 90 percent of environmental cases in which mediators are involved never reach an agreement. A more convincing study with a broader empirical base was done by Harter (1982) who, after examining sixty case studies proposed for negotiation, concluded that only six were in fact negotiable.

The primary weaknesses of these conclusions are that they come primarily from insider accounts and non-theoretically informed case studies. Further, the reader is seemingly asked by the authors to "trust me" without ample evidence being proffered for the authors' assertions. Moreover, few of these works are comparative in nature. For example, as Blackburn (1988) points out, few studies compare environmental mediations with litigation. In sum, there are few studies that demonstrate conclusively the common elements of environmental mediations.

The Supposed Success of Environmental Mediation

Claims concerning the supposed success of environmental mediation abound. Again, what is interesting about the literature is that these "findings" as presented are seemingly based on little, if any, empirical evidence. Examples of the top claims concerning environmental mediation and the "evidence" upon which they are based include the following:

  • Mediation has played a significant role in resolving environmental disputes [O'Connor, 1978 (based on a survey of the opinions of mediators)];
  • Most environmental mediation has occurred in the context of "major" disputes [O'Connor, 1978 (based on a survey of the opinions of mediators)];
  • Mediation is a "compelling alternative" to the use of courts or the legislative process [O'Connor, 1978 (based on a survey of the opinions of mediators)];
  • For environmental conflicts, mediation can achieve more expeditious and lasting processing than ordinary litigation [Talbot, 1983 (based on six case studies)];
  • Environmental mediation is more likely than the courts to move parties away from purely competitive bargaining toward consideration of a wider range of positions and options than they were willing to consider [Richman, in Sandole and Sandole-Staroste, eds., 1987 (based on a case study of the Corps of Engineers, and general mediation theory)];
  • Environmental mediation of nonconformance penalties under the Clean Air Act and pesticide emergency exemptions under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act at the EPA has yielded the "meaningful participation of all those known to have a stake in the outcome" [Croce, 1985 (no empirical evidence cited; based primarily on previous comments of Susskind and Ruckelshaus)];
  • The give and take of environmental negotiation provides "an opportunity to explore the rationale and needs of the participants which often leads to an approach satisfactory to all" [Croce, 1985 (no empirical evidence cited; based primarily on previous comments of Susskind and Ruckelshaus)];
  • Perhaps the single most important outcome of environmental negotiations is that the participants develop a greater understanding of the interests of the other parties [Schneider and Tohn, 1985 (based on case studies of two EPA negotiated rulemakings in which the authors participated)];
  • Most environmental mediations have been initiated by individuals who have hoped to serve as mediators [O'Connor, 1978 (based on a survey of the opinions of mediators)];
  • The regulatory-negotiation process at the EPA "seems to be meeting the expectations of producing more balanced rules in a less adversarial fashion, reducing the likelihood of costly litigation" [Croce, 1985 (no empirical evidence cited; based primarily on previous comments of Susskind and Ruckelshaus)];
  • The potential advantages of environmental mediation include: (1) the possibility that it may facilitate more direct and meaningful participation in the regulatory process by interested parties; (2) the possibility that it may enhance the efficiency of the regulatory process, reducing delays and encouraging timely resolution of contentious issues; and (3) the possibility that it will yield more enduring and satisfying resolutions of contentious issues [Amy, 1983b (thought piece based on a case study of Portage Island, Washington, and secondary sources)].

Environmental mediation was used successfully in the Megaborg oil spill by the Department of Interior, but unsuccessfully in the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The successful strategy in the relatively low stakes Megaborg case included cooperative assessment by major stakeholders, trustee coordination, and agreements on information sharing and contingent valuation techniques [Inderbitzin et al., 1995 (based on accounts of author-lawyers who worked on both cases)].

Not all the conclusions concerning the success of environmental mediation are positive, however. Some authors find reason for pause, or at least skepticism. Here is a sampling of those findings:

  • It is still too soon to say that the negotiation of environmental rulemaking significantly reduces the likelihood of litigation [Schneider and Tohn, 1985 (based on case studies of two EPA negotiated rulemakings in which the authors participated];
  • The dangers of environmental negotiated rulemaking include preexisting centers of power, self-regulation by powerful minorities, problems defining and identifying affected interests, lack of accountability of advocacy organizations, circumvention of national policy because of decentralization, time and money [Rodwin, 1982 (no empirical evidence cited; based on logic and conceptual thinking)];
  • The potential disadvantages of environmental mediation include: (1) the possibility that the congenial atmosphere created by mediators serves to disarm and co-opt environmentalists; (2) the possibility that superior political and economic resources create imbalances of power that allow pro-development interests to extract unfair concessions from environmentalists at the bargaining table; and (3) the possibility that the mediation process itself tends to redefine environmental issues in a way that favors pro-development interests [Amy, 1983a (thought piece based on interviews, reports, and other secondary sources); See also Amy, 1987].

Buttressing this view is Modavi (1996) who concluded that government sponsored mediations in Hawaii demobilized and depoliticized grass-roots opposition to development by channeling activism away from confrontation and publicly visible tactics, and narrowed their demands and concerns (based on two case studies).

The primary weaknesses of these conclusions are the value judgments and measurement difficulties inherent in attempting to ascertain "success" or "failure." As Stukenborg (1994) points out, the environmental mediation field as a whole suffers from both a lack of statistical evidence concerning benefits in cost and time savings and a lack of knowledge of the benefits in highly technical disputes. Further, most of the conclusions presented lack precision. For example, few authors define what they mean by "significant role," "major disputes," "compelling alternative," "lasting results," "meaningful participation," "satisfactory results," "greater understanding," "less adversarial," "efficiency," "timely resolution," "enduring and satisfying resolution," and "create imbalances." At best we have in the environmental mediation literature a handful of examples that are built on a very thin empirical base and are not generalizable.

What Contributes to the Success and Failure of Environmental Mediation?

The literature is replete with wisdom concerning what works and what doesn't work in the field of environmental mediation. Generally, it is maintained by O'Connor (1978) who surveyed the opinions of mediators, that certain ingredients contribute to successful environmental mediation (such as the desire to resolve differences, commitment, a neutral third party, understanding of technical issues, compromises, and written agreements). Susskind (1985), basing his conclusions on three mediated negotiations at the EPA, OSHA, and the Federal Aeronautics Administration, maintains that there are five common ingredients to successful mediated negotiations (including environmental regulatory negotiation): (1) participation by representatives of key stakeholding interests who are able and willing to commit their membership; (2) joint fact-finding; (3) face-to-face negotiation, typically aided by a nonpartisan mediator or facilitator; (4) a focus on inventing the best possible ways of dealing with differences; and (5) the preparation of a written agreement that all parties agree to help implement.

Schneider and Tohn (1985) concluded from examining two EPA negotiated rulemakings, that written agreements are important to reaching consensus. After examining 81 "failed" environmental mediations, Buckle and Thomas-Buckle (1986) concluded that while mediators of "failed" environmental negotiations generally felt that the lack of a written agreement was a sign of failure, participants and observers reported an appreciation of the process and the education derived from the process.

Most authors agree with the commonsensical conclusion that key parties to a environmental controversy must participate in mediations for them to be successful. Nash & Susskind (1987) make this observation based on case studies of municipal solid waste incineration. At the same time, Susskind, McMahon, and Rolley (1987) make the same observation without citing any empirical evidence. A similar conclusion is made by Gusman (1983), without offering any empirical evidence, who wrote that interested parties must be involved in the negotiator selection process to the maximum extent that is practical.

Wondolleck et al. (1996) take these views many steps further in their conclusions based on an examination of six case studies and extensive interviews with citizen group participants in ADR processes. The most successful efforts, they found, are those in which citizens have some of the requisite skills - political savvy, negotiation, and communication skills - as well as the energy and resources to devote to the process.

Moore (1996) shifts the locus of the debate from how mediators define success in dispute resolution to how participants define such success. Basing her conclusions on two case studies of public land planning disputes in the U.S. and in Australia, Moore describes both conditional and unconditional success. The researcher then explains five dispute resolution success categories evidenced in her research: product-oriented, politically oriented, interest-oriented, responsibility-oriented, and relationship-oriented. A final conclusion of Moore's research is that we need to broaden our definition of successful mediations and negotiations beyond whether a written agreement was finalized or not.

Structure and Process

In commenting on the importance of the structure of environmental mediations and the process utilized, many claims are made. Dotson (1983), basing his conclusions on case studies of townhouse, housing, and shopping center disputes, maintains that the structuring of negotiations is a vital precondition for successful mediations. Carpenter and Kennedy (1985) maintain, based on their experiences as environmental mediators, that the first principle of managing environmental conflict is "to find a good solution, you have to understand the problem," while the second principle of managing environmental conflict is "planning a strategy can help you reach a better solution."

Similarly, the same authors (again based on their experiences as environmental mediators), maintain that the parties to a dispute must be involved in designing the process and developing the solution because ownership in the process leads to problem-solving. Basing his agreement on an examination of sixty case studies, Harter (1982) writes that in order to facilitate the process, the parties should establish a set of ground rules to guide the negotiations. Citing two case studies, Riesel (1985) agrees.

The use of process to differentiate between interests and positions is a major theme in the environmental mediation literature. It is interesting to note, however, that the same claim is made whether there is empirical evidence to back it up or not. Priscoli (1987), for example, writes that process can make a difference in separating people from problems and interests from positions, based on an examination of case studies of wetland fill and hydrocarbon exploration. Citing little empirical evidence, Fisher and Ury (1981) write that underlying interests, rather than prior positions, provide a basis for seeing new options and possible settlements. Their conclusions are based primarily on their own experiences, theory, and common sense. Dotson (1983) comes to a similar conclusion based on his case studies of townhouse, housing, and shopping center disputes. Putting it another way, Bingham (1986), in an impressive examination of 161 case studies of environmental mediation, maintains that the consensus-building process appears to be important in terms of whether parties are able to identify the basic interests that underlie one another's specific positions in relation to the perceived issues of the conflict. Finally, a common "truism" found throughout the environmental mediation literature is that lasting solutions are based on interests rather than positions [see e.g., Carpenter and Kennedy, 1985 (based on experiences as environmental mediators) and Riesel, 1985 (citing two case studies)].

The Parties

There is a paucity of empirical data concerning who actually has participated in environmental mediations. The best data come from an examination of 161 cases of environmental mediation where one author found that 82% of the disputes involved units of government, while 35% involved environmental groups and 34% involved private corporations. In only 21% of the case studies were environmental groups and private companies pitted against each other (Bingham, 1986).

The literature is conflicting in terms of the importance of limiting the number of parties who participate in an environmental mediation. Rocking the boat is Bingham (1986), again with her examination of 161 case studies, who concluded that the likelihood of an agreement in an environmental mediation is not clearly affected by the number of parties involved. The vast majority of the literature (which is based on far less empirical evidence), however, concludes otherwise. Major findings, for example, include the following: The number of people involved in environmental mediation must be limited. Limiting the size of an audience and extending specific invitations may increase the likelihood that the desired people will participate [Nash & Susskind, 1987 (based on case studies of municipal solid waste incineration)]. There is a rough practical limit on the numbers of participants to around 15 parties [Harter, 1982 (based on sixty case studies); McCarthy and Shorett, 1984 (little empirical evidence cited, but based on authors' experiences as environmental mediators); and Priscoli, 1987 (based on case studies of wetland fill and hydrocarbon exploration)]. The number of clearly identifiable parties with authority to bind others must be limited in number [Marcus, Nadel, and Merrikin, 1984 (based on case studies and legal analyses concerning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)].

Most authors agree that the parties substantially affected by the negotiations must be included in the negotiations. See, for example, Gusman & Harter, 1986 (based on case studies of hazardous waste siting, site cleanup, and regulatory negotiation); Dotson, 1983 (based on case studies of townhouse, housing, and shopping center disputes); and McCarthy and Shorett, 1984 (little empirical evidence cited, but based on authors' experiences as environmental mediators).

Also a given by most authors is the importance of constituencies. Riesel (1985), for example, writes that the parties must be truly representative of their constituencies and be able to deliver when a deal is struck (two cases studies cited). Dotson (1983) writes that constituents must be kept apprised of the progress of mediation. Failure to check back with constituents can be fatal (based on case studies of townhouse, housing, and shopping center disputes). Susskind, McMahon, and Rolley (1987) make the same claim, but cite no empirical evidence.

Finally, Carpenter and Kennedy (1985) maintain that their experiences as environmental mediators cause them to conclude that human relations are as important as technical data. At the same time, however, the same authors conclude that the parties must agree on basic data.

Motivation

A pivotal finding in the literature is that without incentives to negotiate, the conflicting parties often believe they will achieve more of what they want from staying embroiled in the conflict and not reaching consensus [Bingham, 1986 (based 161 case studies of environmental mediation)]. Hence, it is necessary for all parties to have strong motivations to participate in the mediations. Put another way, negotiated rulemaking is unlikely to succeed unless all parties, including government agencies, are motivated throughout the negotiations by a perception that a negotiated rule would be preferable to a rule developed under traditional processes [Perritt, 1986 (based on four rulemaking negotiations, including two for the EPA)].

Overall incentives to participate in environmental mediation include mitigation of adverse impacts, compensation for actual damages, rewards for assuming risks, and allowing public access to decision making. While Sorensen, Soderstrom, and Carnes (1984) cite no empirical evidence for this conclusion, the authors call for the testing of their conclusions through empirical tests and evaluation. Basing their conclusions in part on statutory and rules interpretation, and in part on a comparison of the Department of Interior's handling of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Megaborg oil spill, Inderbitzin et al. (1995) maintain that potentially responsible parties in a natural resource damage assessment lawsuit have strong incentives to negotiate because the trustees have substantial discretion under law in selecting the appropriate remedy and calculating costs which form the basic measure of damages.

Finally, the most serious incentive (at least for not-for-profit environmental groups) to not participate in an environmental mediation, according to Doniger (1987) is lack of money. This conclusion was based on the author's participation in two EPA negotiated rulemakings.

The Role of Government Officials

There is an interesting debate in the environmental mediation literature centering around whether government officials and agencies should be involved in such mediations, and, the pros and cons of their involvement. Perritt (1986), basing his observations on an examination of four rulemaking negotiations, including two for the EPA, maintains that a government agency sponsoring a negotiated rulemaking should take part in the negotiations. Further, Perritt writes, government agencies should recognize that negotiations can be useful at several stages of rulemaking proceedings. Taking a stronger stance are Forester and Stizel (1989) who maintain that activist mediation by government planners is a viable, practical and ethically desirable strategy. It is interesting to note that these conclusions are not based on empirical evidence, but on theory, as well as the results of a training simulation.

Harter (1982) maintains that it may be more appropriate for government officials to participate in negotiated rulemaking than previously thought because they have realized a diminution of power from their former status as "sovereign decisionmaker[s]", they might be able to conserve resources, and they might be able to save time. Further, if agreement is reached among the parties without government interaction, the parties may not have any indication of what may be acceptable to the agency. Harter's conclusions are based on an impressive examination of sixty case studies.

The pluses of government participation in environmental mediation are strongly touted by some authors. Participation by government officials can play a vital role in legitimating the negotiation process for other participants, according to Dotson (1983) (based on case studies of townhouse, housing, and shopping center disputes). Reaching the same conclusion for a different reason, however, is Wondolleck (1985), who examined case studies of national forest planning. The most valuable impacts a government official can have in environmental mediations, according to the author, is less determining a specific outcome, but in affecting who is involved; how issues are framed; what information is utilized; how alternatives are developed, analyzed and evaluated; how trade-offs are made; and how implementation and monitoring is carried out. Crable (1993), a mediator and arbitrator, predicts the increased use of ADR techniques for resolving environmental disputes. Crable relies in part on historical growth patterns in the use of ADR by states and federal agencies, as well as his own experiences, to reach his conclusions.

Several authors, however, see significant problems with the participation of government officials in environmental mediations. First, there are circumstances where it is not appropriate for government officials to participate in environmental mediation, especially when they may be reluctant to give away power through mediation [Dotson, 1983 (based on case studies of townhouse, housing, and shopping center disputes)]. Tied in with this, there is concern about whether government mediators can be held sufficiently accountable to the interests of the public at large [Susskind and Ozawa, 1983 (based on three case studies, two of them dealing in part with environmental mediation)]. Buttressing this view is Modavi (1996) who studied the mediation of two beach front development disputes by the State of Hawaii's Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution. Modavi criticized the government-sponsored mediations for demobilizing and depoliticizing grass-roots opposition to development while simultaneously promoting the expansion of development in the state.

Citing little empirical evidence, but touting their experiences as environmental mediators, McCarthy and Shorett (1984) maintain that government officials are sometimes skeptical or even hostile to environmental mediation on the grounds that the public interest is not necessarily represented in a negotiated settlement. Offering greater empirical evidence in a study of nine cases of environmental conflicts under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Sachs (1982) outlines obstacles to the use of environmental mediation by federal government agencies: the agencies were operating under formal, often mandated procedures; federal officials feared that use of dispute resolution techniques would violate the Administrative Procedure Act; the agencies were themselves partisan or feared the appearance of partisanship if they were to sponsor mediations; agency officials either did not understand the dispute resolution process or had false information about the process; government officials perceived the process as encompassing more work, less control, legal challenges, and high risks; government attorneys feared that their court cases would be weakened; there was a lack of money; there was no precedent or case history; fear of departing from the status quo; there was a lack of support from the highest echelons of the agency; difficulty working across jurisdictional boundaries; and agency-wide interim reporting requirements that would reveal agency bargaining positions to other participants in the mediation process.

Richard Mays, Senior Enforcement Counsel, Office of Enforcement and Compliance, EPA, similarly maintains (based on his experience in the agency) that ADR techniques, generally, have met resistance in the enforcement arm of the EPA because of the lack of management commitment, the view that ADR techniques are insufficiently aggressive ways to deal with polluters, the difficulty in identifying proper subjects for binding forms of ADR, and budgetary constraints (Bingham et al., 1987). Stukenborg (1994), after reviewing the results of six early environmental mediations, cites the work of Edwards (1986) as support for the idea that many attorneys are reluctant to embrace environmental dispute resolution generally, for fear of "sweetheart" deals between polluters and government agencies such as those that plagued the EPA during the Reagan administration. Melling (1995) after reviewing two cases concerning Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt, warns that environmental dispute resolution may not always be appropriate for government officials. Mediation is not designed to establish policy or to establish standards which implement policy, Melling argues. A mediator is a facilitator, not a policymaker. Melling relies heavily on the example of the Timber Summit of 1989, where government leaders forced dispute resolution processes on unwilling parties unsuccessfully.

But all is not lost. One author concluded that many of the problems with government officials can be countered by consciousness raising through training. A survey of government officials who participated in environmental mediation workshops indicates that after the training, participants perceived a greater understanding of conflict situations, altered how they interacted with their constituent groups, were more sensitive to how and what data they applied to decision making, and were more aware of what alternatives they considered [Wondolleck, 1988 (based on a survey of 214 participants in the U.S. Forest Service workshops with a 72% response rate)].

Finally, one author maintains that environmental mediation can be particularly useful in disputes between and among government agencies (i.e., in intergovernmental relations) because the parties hold some interests in common [Dotson, in Sandole and Sandole-Staroste, eds., 1987]. The author cites no empirical evidence, but bases his conclusions on insights gleaned from his experiences at the Institute for Environmental Negotiation.

Goals

The environmental mediation literature, generally, has little to say about the importance of goals. The main study that emerges on the topic is that done by Nash and Susskind (1987). Basing their view on case studies of municipal solid waste incineration, they authors conclude that the goals of environmental mediation must be well defined. Further, they maintain that similar goals must be shared by participants. Finally, Nash and Susskind posit that if advocates with divergent goals are allowed to participate in an environmental mediation, barriers to consensus building may arise. The use of experts whose opinions and goals are rigid and widely divergent may foster public mistrust and confusion.

Timing

There are mixed opinions in the environmental mediation literature concerning the timing of a mediation effort. Citing no empirical evidence for their conclusion, Susskind, McMahon, and Rolley (1987) maintain that mediation can work either in the early or late stages of conflict. Gusman & Harter (1986), examining case studies of hazardous waste siting, site cleanup, and regulatory negotiation), and Priscoli (1987), examining case studies of wetland fill and hydrocarbon exploration, conclude that the pressure of a deadline must be present before the parties will be ready to sit down at the table. Contradicting these findings is Bingham's 1986 analysis of 161 case studies of environmental mediation. She found that the likelihood of an agreement in an environmental mediation is not clearly affected by the pressure of a deadline.

Most authors, however, agree that the issues must be "ripe," readily apparent and that the parties must be ready to address them [Harter, 1982 (based on sixty case studies); McCarthy and Shorett, 1984 (little empirical evidence cited, but based on authors' experiences as environmental mediators); Gusman & Harter, 1986 (based on case studies of hazardous waste siting, site cleanup, and regulatory negotiation); and Priscoli, 1987 (based on case studies of wetland fill and hydrocarbon exploration)]. Marcus, Nadel, and Merriken (1984), however, strongly maintain that only through a case-by-case examination can it be determined whether a specific dispute - as opposed to general issue categories - is appropriate for regulatory negotiation. Their conclusions are based on case studies and legal analyses concerning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Issues

"Ripeness" is not the only important facet of environmental mediation issues. The content of issues, as well as the number of issues, has been the subject of much debate in the literature. Bingham, for example, who, based on her study of 161 cases, concluded that the likelihood of an agreement in an environmental mediation is not clearly affected by the content of the issues themselves. Seemingly contradicting these findings is the work of Marcus, Nadel, and Merrikin (1984), based on case studies and legal analyses concerning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Those authors concluded that issues where the potential benefits of negotiation are the greatest are also likely to be issues where negotiation is least feasible. Second, they concluded that issues that rank highest with respect to the potential benefits of regulatory negotiation rank lowest with respect to feasibility and vice versa. Finally, the authors concluded that specific categories of issues where the potential benefits of negotiation would be the greatest are waste management, environmental protection, and emergency response because of the contentiousness, cost, and time involved.

There seems to be consensus in the literature concerning the importance of multiple issues in environmental mediations. Multiple issues surfacing simultaneously can be helpful in giving each party some of what it wants, according to Gusman & Harter (1986) who analyzed case studies of hazardous waste siting, site cleanup, and regulatory negotiation. Moreover, successful negotiations are unlikely when there is only a single item that is subject to dispute, since parties must be able to prioritize issues and trade off positions [Marcus, Nadel, and Merrikin, 1984 (based on case studies and legal analyses concerning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)].

Finally, Doniger (1987) maintains that there is a limited range of environmental topics and issues appropriate for negotiation. Therefore, there is a risk that environmental negotiation will be promoted simply for its own sake. The author bases his conclusions on his participation in two EPA negotiated rulemakings.

Morals and Values

The topic of morals and values is an important one in the environmental mediation literature. Most authors agree with Gusman & Harter (1986) and Susskind, McMahon, and Rolley (1987) that disputes involving moral judgments like right and wrong are rarely mediable. It is interesting to note that Gusman and Harter base their conclusions on case studies of hazardous waste siting, site cleanup, and regulatory negotiation, while Susskind, McMahon, and Rolley fail to cite any empirical evidence. Tied in with this, another popular conclusion in the literature is that agreement is unlikely if parties must compromise fundamental values. [See, for example, Harter, 1982 (based on sixty case studies); and Priscoli, 1987 (based on case studies of wetland fill and hydrocarbon exploration)]. Supporting this view is Melling (1995) who studied the use of environmental mediation in disputes concerning old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest. Melling points out that many environmentalists involved in the forest disputes adamantly maintain that since any further cutting in the old growth Northwest forests is morally wrong, consensus means compromise, and compromise is always bad for the environment. Hence, they have been unwilling to participate in environmental mediation efforts.

Citizens' values also are important in environmental mediation efforts. Accordingly, Beatty (1991) maintains that survey research can be a useful tool in identifying citizens' values (based on a case study of air pollution in Colorado Springs).

The Role of Mediators and Facilitators

A mediator or a facilitator can be significantly helpful in resolving complex, multiparty issues, according to Gusman & Harter's (1986) analysis of case studies of hazardous waste siting, site cleanup, and regulatory negotiation. But what, exactly, are appropriate roles for the environmental mediator or the environmental facilitator? The literature is rich with suggestions.

First, a neutral mediator or facilitator can be useful in identifying interested parties and determining whether they are willing to negotiate in good faith. In fact, many authors maintain that such action is a key factor in promoting a harmonious process. [See, for example, Harter, 1982 (based on sixty case studies); Riesel, 1985 (two cases studies cited); and Croce, 1985 (no empirical evidence cited; the author bases his conclusions on previous comments of Susskind and Ruckelshaus)].

Second, mediators should do dispute assessments. According to Bingham's (1986) study of 161 case studies of environmental mediation, success in environmental mediation is increased by mediators doing a dispute assessment prior to any mediation in order to help the parties decide whether to participate and whether the particular dispute is amenable to mediation. Riesel (1985) agreed and wrote that an environmental mediator must often do a considerable amount of pre-negotiation leg-work (two cases studies cited).

Third, mediators should lay out the costs and benefits of mediation for the parties. According to Riesel (1985), an environmental mediator must help the parties recognize some of the real costs they face if the matter is not resolved through negotiation. Again, Riesel bases his conclusions on two case studies.

Fourth, a mediator/facilitator can help participants prepare for negotiations by clarifying values [Dotson, 1983 (based on case studies of townhouse, housing, and shopping center disputes)].

Fifth, a major job of the environmental mediator is to deal with the usual inequality of information among parties, and in effect, the inequality of power among parties [Riesel, 1985 (two cases studies cited)].

Sixth, an environmental mediator should help build trust among the parties. The longterm success of mediation depends in large part on the extent to which others are willing to trust a broker and refer cases for mediation, according to Dotson (1983) who based his conclusions on case studies of townhouse, housing, and shopping center disputes. Tied in with this, Riesel (1985) maintains that the skilled environmental mediator will encourage the parties to make intermediate concessions that will assist in the building of trust.

What shouldn't an environmental mediator, facilitator, or negotiator do? Without citing any empirical evidence, Susskind, McMahon and Rolley (1987) argue that a mediator should not be passive, since a passive mediator can hinder successful negotiation. In addition, Priscoli (1987), maintains that the mediator or negotiator must not lose his or her semblance of neutrality. Facilitators must be perceived as neutral parties to a conflict in order to be successful. Priscoli bases his conclusions on case studies of wetland fill and hydrocarbon exploration.

Other findings in the literature concerning the role of environmental mediators and facilitators are more diffuse. Perritt (1986), for example, maintains that a government agency sponsoring a negotiated rulemaking proceeding should select a person skilled in techniques of dispute resolution to assist the negotiating group in reaching an agreement. That agency, the mediator or facilitator, and where appropriate, other participants in a negotiated rulemaking should be prepared to address disagreements within a particular constituency. Perritt based his conclusions on four rulemaking negotiations, including two for the EPA.

Schneider and Tohn (1985) maintain that when working with large committees, a team of mediators, rather than a single person, is more effective. They base their conclusions on case studies of two EPA negotiated rulemakings in which the authors participated. Tied in with this, the authors maintain that having a team of specialists (e.g., economists and statisticians) as members of a mediation team helps address issues that demand technical expertise.

What kind of preparation is best for environmental mediators or facilitators? There are two schools of thought concerning the kind of training needed by environmental mediators: the process/procedure school and the substance school. Most authors make the commonsensical claim that a combination of substantive and process skills is probably the ideal. (See, e.g., Dotson, in Sandole and Sandole-Staroste, eds., 1987. Dotson does not cite any empirical evidence, but bases his insights based on his experience at the Institute for Environmental Negotiation.)

Power

The importance of power differentials is widely discussed in the environmental mediation literature. Most authors agree that if power is unequal, the parties will not negotiate. Parties must perceive interdependence and be constrained from acting unilaterally. At the same time, each of the parties must have sufficient power or influence to exercise some sanction over the ability of other parties to take unilateral action. [For representative authors, see Harter, 1982 (based on sixty case studies); McCarthy and Shorett, 1984 (little empirical evidence cited, but based on authors' experiences as environmental mediators); Gusman & Harter, 1986 (based on case studies of hazardous waste siting, site cleanup, and regulatory negotiation); and Priscoli, 1987 (based on case studies of wetland fill and hydrocarbon exploration).] A recent case study of the Shasta Costa forest planning process in the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S., for example, concluded that the environmental mediation process utilized there was not able to overcome a power imbalance, thus contributing to a lack of success (Daniels and Walker, 1995).

Implementation

The importance of implementation considerations permeates the environmental mediation literature. Some means of implementing the final agreement must be available and acceptable to the parties, according to Priscoli's (1987) analysis of case studies of wetland fill and hydrocarbon exploration. Further, the parties will be unlikely to negotiate seriously if the ultimate agreement is not likely to be implemented according to Marcus, Nadel, and Merrikin (1984) who based their conclusions on case studies and legal analyses concerning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Next, and perhaps most importantly, the factor most clearly associated with environmental agreements being reached is whether the people with the authority to implement the decision participated directly in the mediation process according to Bingham's (1986) analysis if 161 case studies of environmental mediation.

McCool (1993) examined the application of dispute resolution techniques to address conflicts over contemporary American Indian water claims. This implementation study concluded that despite the fact that few of the conditions needed for constructive negotiations exists in the case of Indian water rights, the U.S. government continues to insist on the use of environmental mediation techniques. The author concludes that given no other alternatives, the American Indians involved in the negotiations may be repeating history by giving up enormous resources in exchange for the promise of federal assistance.

Alternative Approaches

A final theme in the environmental mediation literature concerns alternative approaches. The most frequently cited alternative approach involves the use of computers. Computer modeling of the diverse interests of parties may provide negotiators with a sense of reality about the relative outcomes of different options, according to Nyhart (1983), based on a case study of the Law of the Sea negotiations. A computer mediator used in a telephone conferencing setting may limit polarization because individuals are drawn into a dialogue early in a dispute, according to a Stodolsky (1980). In one experiment, the computer selected speakers in the order in which they requested to speak. In another setting, the computer resolved conflicting requests to speak in favor of the person who had thus far spoken the least. Mediation participants also were able to indicate anonymously when they felt a speaker was in error, which eliminated group pressure as an impediment to reaching consensus.

Bojorquez-Tapia et al. (1994) report using a computerized classification of land systems in Baja, Mexico, to aid multivariate analyses of potential environmental conflicts when a land system presented similar suitability for competitive land uses. Finally, Maguire and Boiney (1993), analyze a hypothetical environmental dispute in Zaire concerning the best policy for management of an endangered species by merging decision analysis and dispute resolution techniques.

Summary and Conclusions

This paper has provided an overview of some of the major conclusions found in the environmental mediation literature. How do we know what we know? We know what we know primarily through atheoretical case studies, "wisdom" derived from the experiences of environmental mediators (see e.g., Adler, 1995), and conceptual thinking. There is little rigorous empirical evidence to back up much of the claims just presented. While case studies, insider accounts, and conceptual thinking are necessary prerequisites of sustainable research in this area, they are not sufficient. In order to judge the usefulness of environmental mediation for pubic managers, we need survey research and additional comparative case studies that examine not just the spectacular cases but also the less-spectacular, less-successful cases of environmental mediation. Moreover, we need additional studies of what interventions are more likely to be successful than others under what conditions, as well as long-range longitudinal studies of the outcomes of environmental mediation efforts to see if such agreements really last. Most important, we need an adequate theoretical base from which researchers can predict effects, test them, and ascertain, in a more systematic and rigorous fashion, the impact of environmental mediation.

References

Adler, Peter S. "Pig Wars: Mediating Forest Management Conflicts in Hawaii." Negotiation Journal (July, 1995) 209-215.

Amy, Douglas J. "The Politics of Environmental Mediation." Ecological Law Quarterly, 11 (1983a) 1-19.

Amy, Douglas J. "Environmental Mediation: An Alternative Approach to Policy Stalemates." Policy Sciences, 15 (1983b) 345-365.

Bacow, Lawrence S. and Michael Wheeler. Environmental Dispute Resolution. New York: Plenum Press (1984).

Beatty, Kathleen M. "Public Opinion Data for Environmental Decision Making: The Case of Colorado Springs." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 11 (March, 1991) 29-37.

Bingham, Gail. Resolving Environmental Disputes: A Decade of Experience. Washington D.C.: The Conservation Foundation (1986).

Bingham, Gail, Frederick R. Anderson, R. Gaull Silberman, F. Henry Habicht, David F. Zoll, and Richard H. Mays. "Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution To Government Litigation and Enforcement Cases." Administrative Law Review, 1 (Fall, 1987) 527-551.

Blackburn, J. Walton. "Environmental Mediation as an Alternative to Litigation." Policy Studies Journal, 16, 3 (Spring, 1988) 562-74.

Bojorquez-Tapia, Luis A., Enrique Ongay-Delhumeau, and Exequiel Ezcurra. "Multivariate Approach for Suitability Assessment and Environmental Conflict Resolution."Journal of Environmental Management, 41 (1994) 187-198.

Buckle, Leonard G. and Suzanne R. Thomas-Buckle. "Placing Environmental Mediation in Context: Lessons From `Failed' Mediations." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 6 (March, 1986) 55-70.

Carpenter, Susan and W.J.D. Kennedy. "Managing Environmental Conflict By Applying Common Sense." Negotiation Journal, 1 (April, 1985) 149-161.

Crable, Stephen. "ADR: A Solution for Environmental Disputes." Arbitration Journal (March, 1993) 24-36.

Croce, Cynthia. "Negotiation Instead of Confrontation." EPA Journal, 11 (April, 1985) 23-24.

Daniels, Steven E. and Gregg B. Walker. "Managing Local Environmental Conflict Amidst National Controversy." The International Journal of Conflict Management. 6, 3 (July, 1995) 290-311.

deHaven-Smith, Lance and John R. Wodraska. "Consensus-Building for Integrated Resources Planning." Public Administration Review, 56, 4 (July/August 1996) 367-371.

Dinkins, Carol E. "Shall We Fight or Will We Finish: Environmental Dispute Resolution in a Litigious Society." Environmental Law Reporter, 14 (November, 1984) 10398-10401.

Doniger, David D. "Negotiated Rulemaking at the EPA: Examples of Wood Stove Emissions and Truck Engine Emissions." Environmental Law Reporter, 17 (July, 1987) 10251-10254.

Dotson, A. Bruce. "Who and How? Participation in Environmental Negotiation." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 4 (June, 1983) 203-217.

Edwards, Harry T. "Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?" Harvard Law Review, 99 (1986) 668, 681.

Eisenberg, Melvin Aron. "Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking." Harvard Law Review, 89 (February, 1976) 637-81.

Fiorino, Daniel. "Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process."Public Administration Review, 48 (1988) 764-772.

Fisher, Roger and William Ury. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. New York: Penguin Books (1981).

Forester, John and David Stitzel. "Beyond Neutrality: The Possibilities of Activist Mediation in Public Sector Conflicts." Negotiation Journal, 5 (July, 1989) 251-264.

Gusman, Sam. "Selecting Participants for a Regulatory Negotiation." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 4 (1983) 195-202.

Gusman, Sam and Philip J. Harter. "Mediating Solutions to Environmental Risks." Annual Review of Public Health, 7 (1986) 293-312.

Harter, Philip J. "Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise" Georgetown Law Journal, 71 (October, 1982) 1-118.

Inderbitzin, Sarah L., Nicholas Targ, James L. Byrnes, and Bruce A. Johnson. "The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Natural Resource Damage Assessments," William and Mary Environmental law and Policy Review, 20 (Fall, 1995) 1-31.

Jenks, Stephen. "County Compliance with North Carolina's Solid-Waste Mandate: A Conflict-Based Model." Publius, 24 (Spring, 1994) 17-36.

Lach, Denise. "Introduction: Environmental Conflict." Sociological Perspectives 39, 2 (1996) 211-217.

Maguire, Lynn A. and Lindsley G. Boiney. "Resolving Environmental Disputes: A Framework Incorporating Decision Analysis and Dispute Resolution Techniques." Journal of Environmental Management, 42 (1994) 31-48.

Marcus, Alfred A., Mark V. Nadel and Karen Merrikin. "The Applicability of Regulatory Negotiation to Disputes Involving the Nuclear Regulatory Commission." Administrative Law Review, 36 (Summer, 1984) 213-238.

Martin, Geoffrey R. "The `Practical' and the `Theoretical' Split in Modern Negotiation Literature." Negotiation Journal, 4 (January, 1988) 45-54.

McCarthy, Jane and Alice Shorett. Negotiating Settlements: A Guide to Environmental Mediation. New York: American Arbitration Association (1984).

McCool, Daniel. "Indian Water Settlements: The Prerequisites of Successful Negotiation." Policy Studies Journal, 21, 2 (1993) 243-261.

McCrory, John P. "Environmental Mediation - Another Piece for the Puzzle." Vermont Law Review, 6 (Spring, 1981) 49-84.

Melling, Tom. "Bruce Babbitt's Use of Governmental Dispute Resolution: A Mid-Term Report Card." Land and Water Law Review, 30 (1995) 57-90.

Modavi, Neghin. "Mediation of Environmental Conflicts in Hawaii: Win-Win or Co-optation?" Sociological Perspectives, 39, 2 (1996) 301-316.

Moore, Susan A. "Defining `Successful' Environmental Dispute Resolution: Case Studies from Public Land Planning in the United States and Australia." Environmental Impact Assessment Review 16 (1996) 151-169.

Nachmias, David and Chava Nachmias (1987). Research Methods in the Social Sciences. 3rd edition. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.

Nash, Jennifer and Lawrence E. Susskind. "Mediating Conflict Over Dioxin Risks of Resource Recycling: Lessons From a Flawed Process." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 7 (March, 1987) 79-83.

Nyhart, J.D. "Negotiating Conflict Over Marine Resources: The Use of Multiparty Models." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 4 (December, 1983) 557-560.

O'Connor, David. "Environmental Mediation: The State-of-the-Art?" Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 2 (October, 1978) 9-17.

Perritt, Henry H., Jr. "Negotiated Rulemaking in Practice." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 5 (Spring, 1986) 482-95.

Priscoli, Jerome Delli. "Conflict Resolution for Water Resource Projects: Using Facilitation and Mediation to Write Section 404 General Permits." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 7 (December, 1987) 313-326.

Pruitt, Dean G. "Trends in the Scientific Study of Negotiation and Mediation." Negotiation Journal, 2 (July, 1986) 237-244.

Riesel, Daniel. "Negotiation and Mediation of Environmental Disputes." Journal on Dispute Resolution, 1 (Fall, 1985) 99-111.

Rodwin, Marc A. "Can Bargaining and Negotiation Change the Administrative Process?" Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 3 (December, 1982) 373-386.

Sachs, Andy. "Nationwide Study Identifies Barriers to Environmental Negotiation." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 3 (March, 1982) 95-100.

Sandole, Dennis J.D. and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste. Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal and International Applications. New York: New York University Press (1987).

Schneider, Peter and Ellen Tohn. "Success in Negotiating Environmental Regulations." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 5 (March, 1985) 67-77.

Schoenbrod, David. "Limits and Dangers of Environmental Mediation: A Review Essay." New York University Law Review, 58 (December, 1983) 1453-1476.

Sorensen, John H., Jon Soderstrom, and Sam A. Carnes. "Sweet for the Sour: Incentives for Environmental Mediation." Environmental Management, 8 (July, 1984) 287-294.

Stodolsky, David. "Automatic Mediation in Group Problem Solving." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 1 (March, 1980) 80-90.

Stukenbork, Charlene. "The Proper Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Environmental Conflicts," University of Dayton Law Review, 19 (Spring, 1994) 1305-1339.

Susskind, Lawrence. "It's Time to Shift Our Attention from Impact Assessment to Strategies for Resolving Environmental Disputes." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 2 (October, 1978) 4-8.

Susskind, Lawrence. "Mediating Public Disputes." Negotiation Journal (January, 1985) 19-22.

Susskind, Lawrence, Gerard McMahon and Stephanie Rolley. "Mediating Development Disputes: Some Barriers and Bridges to Successful Negotiation." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 7 (June, 1987) 127-138.

Susskind, Lawrence and Connie Ozawa. "Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector." American Behavioral Scientist, 27 (November/December, 1983) 255-279.

Susskind, Lawrence and Connie Ozawa. "Mediating Public Disputes: Obstacles and Possibilities." Journal of Social Issues, 41 (1985) 145-159.

Talbot, Allan. Settling Things: Six Case Studies in Environmental Mediation. Washington D.C.: Conservation Foundation/Ford Foundation (1983).

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Enforcement Actions." Environment Reporter (June 2, 1995) 301-304.

Waller, Tom. "Knowledge, Power and Environmental Policy: Expertise, The Lay Public, and Water Management in the Western United States." The Environmental Professional 17 (1995) 153-166.

Whitman, Bradford F. "Alternative Dispute Resolution Needed for Superfund Remedies." Environment Reporter (December 17, 1993) 1533-1536.

Wondolleck, Julia. "The Importance of Process in Resolving Environmental Disputes." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 5 (December, 1985) 341-356.

Wondolleck, Julia. Public Lands Conflict and Resolution: Managing National Forest Disputes. New York: Plenum Press (1988).

Wondolleck, Julia. "The Role of Training in Providing Opportunities for Environmental and Natural Resource Dispute Resolution." Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 8 (September, 1988) 233-248.

Wondelleck, Julia M., Nancy J. Manring, and James E. Crowfoot. "Teetering at the Top of the Ladder: The Experience of Citizen Group Participants in Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes." Sociological Perspectives, 39, 2 (1996) 249-262.

Zhiyong, Lan. "A Conflict Resolution Approach to Public Administration." Public Administration Review, 57, 1 (January/February, 1997) 27-35.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Kirk Emerson of the University of Arizona and Lisa Bingham of Indiana University for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. Parts of this paper were previously published in Mediating Environmental Conflicts: Theory and Practice, J. Walton Blackburn and Willa Bruce, eds. New York: Quorum Books (1995).

Article Copyright 1997 by Rosemary O'Leary.

Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute
Last updated: July 30, 2004
Comments: ICRI Administrator
Copyright 1999 - Indiana University, Bloomington